We investigate four well-known negative translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic within a substructural setting. We find that in affine logic the translation schemes due to Kolmogorov and Gödel both satisfy Troelstra's criteria for a negative translation. On the other hand, the schemes of Glivenko and Gentzen both fail for affine logic, but for different reasons: one can extend affine logic to make Glivenko work and Gentzen fail and vice versa. By contrast, in the setting of Łukasiewicz logic, we can prove a general result asserting that a wide class of formula translations including those of Kolmogorov, Gödel, Gentzen and Glivenko not only satisfy Troelstra's criteria with respect to a natural intuitionistic fragment of Łukasiewicz logic but are all equivalent.
Introduction
Negative translations (also known as double negation translations) have a long history in logic and proof theory. Kolmogorov [14] was probably the first one to observe that classical logic can be "embedded" into its intuitionistic fragment. He defined a translation A → A K which places double negations in front of every subformula, and showed that A is provable classically if and only if A K is provable intuitionistically. Around the same time, Glivenko [10] , Gödel [11] and Gentzen [8] defined more "economic" translations that also eliminate classical principles from proofs at the cost of introducing extra negations, but not as many as Kolmogorov' s.
In the present paper we recast these negative translations in the setting of substructural logic, concentrating on logics lying between intuitionistic affine AL i logic and classical Łukasiewicz logic ŁL c . This will shed light on the amount of contraction required in order to make the translations work.
In Section 2, we define a fragment of classical Łukasiewicz logic ŁL c , which we will call intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic 1 ŁL i . Just as Łukasiewicz logic [12] is a subsystem of classical logic CL, intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic is a subsystem of the usual intuitionistic logic IL [19] . This paper focuses on propositional logic, leaving a similar study for predicate logic to future work. The main result in this paper is that all four standard negative translations of CL into IL are also negative translations of ŁL c into ŁL i (Section 5). Our result relies on several derivations of novel theorems of ŁL i , in particular the result that, over ŁL i , the double negation mapping A → A ⊥⊥ is a homomorphism (Section 4).
We also prove that Kolmogorov's and Gödel's translations are even negative translations of AL c into AL i (Section 3), and in an appendix give a brief description of counter-examples demonstrating that Glivenko and Gentzen are not: in fact AL i can be extended so as to make the Glivenko translation a negative translation but not the Gentzen translation or vice versa.
In the present paper, whenever we need to show that a formula is provable in one of our logics, we do so constructively. In the case of ŁL i most non-trivial derivations involve intricate applications of [CWC] . We express here our gratitude to the late Bill McCune for the development of the automated theorem prover Prover9 and the finite-model finder Mace4 [16] , which we have used extensively to find derivations or counter-models to our various conjectures. Most of the ŁL i derivations presented here were initially found by Prover9. Perhaps remarkably, we found it possible to organise and present the derivations in what we believe is a systematic and human-readable style.
2 Definitions of the Logics
Language
We work in a language, L, built from a countable set of propositional variables Var = {P 1 , P 2 , . . .}, the constant ⊥ (falsehood) and the binary connectives ⊸ (implication) and ⊗ (conjunction). We write A ⊥ for A ⊸ ⊥ and ⊤ for ⊥ ⊸ ⊥. Our choice of notation for connectives is that commonly used for affine logic, since all the systems we consider will be extensions of intuitionistic affine logic.
As usual, we adopt the convention that ⊸ associates to the right and has lower precedence than ⊗, which in turn has lower precedence than (·) ⊥ . So, for example, the brackets in
The logics
In this section we give natural deduction systems (in sequent style) for the logics we will study. The judgments of the calculi are sequents Γ ⊢ A where the context Γ is a multiset of formulas and A is a formula. The rules of inference for all the calculi comprise the sequent formulation of a natural deduction system shown in Figure 2 .
The six calculi are defined by adding to the rules of Figure 2 some or all of the following axiom schemata: assumption [ASM], contraction [CON], ex falso quodlibet [EFQ] , double negation elimination [DNE] , and commutativity of weak conjunction [CWC], defined in Figure 3 . The six calculi and their axiom schemata are as defined in Table 1 .
The systems AL i , AL c , ŁL i and ŁL c are intuitionistic and classical variants of affine logic and Łukasiewicz logic. IL and CL as we shall see shortly are the usual intuitionistic and classical logic. The relationship between the six logics is depicted in Figure 1 .
As our axiom schemata all allow additional premisses Γ in the context, the following rule of weakening
is admissible in all our logics, since given a proof tree with Γ ⊢ B at the root, we may obtain a proof of Γ, A ⊢ B by adding A to the context of every sequent on some path from the root to a leaf (axiom). Also, note that in intuitionistic affine logic AL i , and hence in all the logics, the contraction axiom [CON] is inter-derivable with the contraction rule
Thus with [CON] we have the structural rules of weakening and contraction, which proves our claim that IL and CL are the usual intuitionistic and classical propositional logics.
Many of the results in this paper involve the derivability of a particular sequent in one of our calculi above (mainly ŁL i ). When deriving these, we will make clear in the statement of the result which logic we are using, and will present proofs as sequences of formulas, all of which are either an assumption, an axiom, or a consequence of previously derived formulas. We illustrate this with the following basic result:
Proof: 
[By (2) and (4)] The above lemma shows that (over ŁL i ) A ⊗ (A ⊸ B) is the weakest formulas that is stronger than both A and B. Note that since we do not have contraction in ŁL i , in the above proof it is important that (3) is only used once, and that its consequence (4) is also only used once, and so on.
Notation. We will apply the [CWC] axiom in slightly different ways. For instance, in the proof above we had derived C and C ⊸ B, and by [CWC] were able to conclude B ⊗ (B ⊸ C). In some cases we will find it more convenient to state the two conclusions B and B ⊸ C in separate lines of the proof, specially when these are then used in different ways later on (e.g. see proof of Lemma 7) .
The rules of Figure 2 and the axioms of Figure 3 are closed under substitution of formulas for variables. Hence a substitution instance of a theorem in any of our logics is again a theorem of that logic. When reading a result such as Lemma 1, it is immaterial whether one views the letters A, B and C as metavariables ranging over L or as specific variables in Var ⊂ L.
As mentioned in the introduction, in [6] one can find an earlier proposal of viewing Łukasiewicz logic as an extension of affine logic. In that context, a rule called (&, l c ) was added to classical affine logic in order to obtain classical Łukasiewicz logic. It is easy to check that in the presence of weakening the premise of that rule is derivable, which means that over affine logic the rule (&, l c ) should be viewed as the axiom schema A & B ⊢ A ⊗ (A ⊸ B). Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we extend ŁL i with the additive conjunction A & B, with the usual rules, as in [6] . Particularly in the literature on Łukasiewicz logic the systems that we have presented above in natural (in sequent style) deduction are traditionally presented as Hilbertstyle systems with modus ponens as the only rule of inference (see [12] , Def. 3.1.3, for a Hilbert-style presentation of ŁL c ). It can be shown that the two presentations are equivalent in the sense that the sequent A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ⊢ A is derivable in one of logics iff A 1 ⊸ A 2 ⊸ . . . ⊸ A n ⊸ A is derivable in the corresponding Hilbert style system.
Derived connectives
In additon to the primitive connectives ⊗ and ⊸, we will make extensive use of the following four derived binary connectives A ⊓ B, A ⊔ B, A ⇒ B, A ↓ B defined as follows:
Recall that we are assuming conjunction binds more strongly than the implication, so that A ⇒ B is A ⊸ (A ⊗ B). For the new connectives we will also use the convention that ⊓, ⊔ and ↓ all bind more strongly than ⇒. So (A ⊔ B) ⇒ (C ⊓ D), for instance, may be written as A ⊔ B ⇒ C ⊓ D.
AL i cannot prove the commutativity of ⊓ and ⊔. ŁL i adds the commutativity of ⊓ to AL i as an axiom schema, but still can't prove the commutativity of ⊔. In ŁL i , the pre-conjunction A ⊓ B behaves like the additive conjunction A&B of linear logic. ŁL c has been defined above as ŁL i extended with [DNE], but it can be shown that one also obtains ŁL c from ŁL i by adding the commutativity of ⊔ as an axiom schema. In ŁL c , the pre-disjunction A ⊔ B then behaves like the additive disjunction A ⊕ B of linear logic. In IL, when full contraction is available, the two conjunctions A ⊓ B and A ⊗ B become equivalent. However, ⊥ ⊔ A ≡ A ⊥⊥ while A ⊔ ⊥ ≡ A, so that the commutativity of ⊔ is intuitionistically unacceptable as it implies [DNE]. We have chosen our notation so that in each of the derived connectives the left operand appears both positively and negatively while the right operand appears only positively in ⊓, ⊔ and ⇒ and only negatively in ↓.
Let A[B] be a formula that contains B as a subformula. It is easy to show, by
We conclude this section with a short list of basic theorems of AL i which will prove very useful in the sequel.
Lemma 2 (AL i ) The following have simple and short derivations:
For instance, we can prove (vi) via the following chain of simple equivalences:
Negative Translations
In [18] , Troelstra identifies certain requirements on a translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic and shows that any two translations satisfying these requirements are intuitionistically equivalent. To set up the analogue of this characterisation in our substructural setting, we first define the notion of negative formula in the language L.
Definition 2
The set N of negative formulas is defined inductively as
We can now formulate an adaptation of Troelstra's requirements:
Conditions (NT1), (NT2) and (NT3) correspond to Troelstra's [18, Section 10] (iii), (i) and (ii), respectively. We have rearranged them as we will show that in ŁL i condition (NT3) is redundant (Theorem 23). It is often the case in practice that A † ∈ N , so that (NT1) holds trivially.
In this section we shall consider the four well-known negative translations for IL, namely, Kolmogorov, Gödel, Gentzen and Glivenko, in the context of affine logic AL i (cf. [7] for an analysis of the relationship between these translations in the setting of intuitionistic first-order logic). We prove that both Kolmogorov and Gödel are negative translation for AL i , and give counter-examples to show that Gentzen and Glivenko fail to satisfy (NT3). In Section 5, however, we will see that in ŁL i all these formula translations are negative translations, and in fact, we will also be able to show all negative translations are provably equivalent in ŁL i .
Kolmogorov and Gödel translations
First of all, we show that both the Kolmogorov and the Gödel translations are in fact negative translations for affine logic, i.e. no contraction is necessary to prove (NT1) -(NT3). Let L be the language of the theories AL c and AL i .
Definition 4 (Kolmogorov translation [14] ) For each formula A ∈ L associate a formula A K ∈ L inductively as follows:
We will also consider the following negative translation which can be distilled from [11] . In Gödel's presentation an implication A ⊸ B is translated as (A ⊗ B ⊥ ) ⊥ . We use here that in AL i this is equivalent to A ⊸ B ⊥⊥ . The translation often referred to as the Gödel-Gentzen translation will be treated in the following section, where we attribute it to Gentzen. It will become clear that in the substructural setting the Gödel translation is not the same as the Gentzen one.
Definition 5 (Gödel translation [11] ) For each formula A ∈ L we first associate a formula A * ∈ L inductively as follows:
Then we define A Gö = (A * ) ⊥⊥ . Gödel [11] in fact does not need this final double negation since in Heyting arithmetic one can already prove (A * ) ⊥⊥ ⊢ A * . Hence in that context we can even take A Gö = A * . In AL i , however, we need the outermost double negation to make the proof of the following theorem go through.
Theorem 3 Both the Kolmogorov translation (·) K and the Gödel translation (·) Gö are negative translations for AL i .
Proof: In the case of Kolmogov we have: 
K . This can be done as
can also be easily shown as
Finally, the case of [⊗E] can be shown as
In the final step above we are using that (A K ) ⊥⊥ ↔ A K , which is easy to show. For the Gödel translation, it is enough to show that A K ↔ A Gö in AL i . We do that by induction on the structure of A. The base case is trivial. Recall that A Gö = (A * ) ⊥⊥ . For implication we have
Similarly for conjunction
That concludes the inductive proof.
Gentzen and Glivenko translations
For both the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations (defined below) a corresponding Theorem 3 no longer holds for AL i . These translations rely on uses of contraction which are not available in affine logic. Nevertheless, we will find that the amount of contraction available in Łukasiewicz logic, via [CWC], is sufficient for these translations to go through (Section 5). The Gentzen negative translation works by adding double negations on all the atoms of a given formula:
Definition 6 (Gentzen translation [8] ) For each formula A ∈ L associate a formula A Gen ∈ L inductively as follows:
As
Theorem 4 The translation (·)
Gen is not a negative translation for AL i .
Proof: We show that (NT3) fails for the Gentzen translation on AL i . Let P, Q be atomic formulas and take A ≡ (P ⊗ Q) ⊥⊥ ⊸ (P ⊗ Q). Obviously AL c proves A, since A is an instance of [DNE]. However the Gentzen translation of A is
which is not provable in AL i (see Lemma 25 part (i) in Appendix A for a model demonstrating this).
The Glivenko negative translation simply doubly negates the whole formula:
Definition 7 (Glivenko translation [10] ) Given a formula A ∈ L define its Glivenko translation A Gli as A Gli ≡ A ⊥⊥ .
Theorem 5 The Glivenko translation is not a negative translation for AL i .
Proof: As with the Gödel translation, we also show that (NT3) fails in the Glivenko translation for AL i . Let P be an atomic formula. The Glivenko translation of P ⊥⊥ ⊸ P (an instance of [DNE]) is (P ⊥⊥ ⊸ P ) ⊥⊥ , which is not provable in AL i (see Lemma 25 part (ii) in Appendix A for a model demonstrating this).
We conclude by noting that the Gentzen and the Glivenko translations do not have to fail simultaneously, i.e. there are extensions of AL i for which one translation works but the other does not.
Theorem 6 There are extensions A 1 and A 2 of AL i such that
Gli is a negative translation for A 1 but (·) Gen is not;
(ii) (·) Gen is a negative translation for A 2 but (·) Gli is not.
Proof: See Theorem 26 in Appendix A.
Remark 1 AL i can be presented using a Gentzen-style sequent calculus that admits cut-elimination. This leads to a relatively efficient decision procedure for AL i which one can use as an alternative to semantic methods to decide unprovability where needed in the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5. However, we do not know of a proof based on cut-elimination for Theorem 6.
Homomorphism Properties of Double Negation in ŁL i
Our goal in this section is to find ŁL i derivations of some important theorems about the primitive and derived connectives. These include:
• a derivation of [DNE] ⊥⊥ (Corollary 13);
• a duality property between ⊔ and ↓ (Theorem 14); and,
• homomorphism properties of the double negation mapping A → A ⊥⊥ with respect to both implication (Section 4.3) and conjunction (Section 4.4);
As we have already remarked, the derivations we will give have been extracted by analysis of computer-generated proofs found by the Prover9 automated theoremprover. Our contribution was to propose conjectures to Prover9, to study the machineoriented proofs it found and to present the proofs in a human-intelligible form by breaking them down into structurally interesting lemmas. This was an iterative process since often Prover9 was able to find simpler proofs of a lemma when presented with it as a conjecture in isolation. In cases when Prover9 was unable to find a proof, Mace4 was often able to find a counter-model: a finite model of the logic in question in which the conjecture can be seen to fail. See Appendix A for examples of algebraic models of AL i found by Mace4.
It follows from work on commutative GBL-algebras that ŁL i is decidable [5] . However the problem is PSPACE-complete. In [2] , we give a simple indirect method for demonstrating that a formula is valid in intuitionistic Łukasiewicz Logic, a heuristic method which we have used extensively in parallel with attempts to find explicit proofs and counter-examples with Prover9 and Mace4.
Basic identities on ⊔, ⇒, ⊓
We start by proving in ŁL i several useful results about the derived connectives ⊔, ⊓ and ⇒.
[By (5), (7) and CWC]
[By (6), (8) and ⊸E] (10)
[By (10), (11) and CWC] (12)
A [By (9), (13) and ⊸E] (14) A ⊗ B
[By (12) , (14) and ⊸E]
The following lemma is used in Section 4.4. It shows that from A ⊸ C and C ⊸ B we can conclude more than A ⊸ C.
[From (16) , easy] (17)
[By (15) and (17) and CWC]
[By (18) and Def. of A ⊓ B]
So far, we have not used the constant ⊥. We now prove a few basic properties of (·) ⊥ and its relation to the derived connectives.
[By (19) and (20)
] (21)
A ⊥ ⇒ B [By (21) and Lemma 7] It turns out that many intuitionistically unacceptable equivalences become provable in ŁL i "under" a negation. For example, our first important result is that in ŁL i strong implication ⇒ is a dual of a weak conjunction ⊓ in the sense that (A ⊓ B) ⊥ ↔ A ⇒ B ⊥ . This is akin to the relation between conjunction and implication (A ⊗ B) ⊥ ↔ A ⊸ B ⊥ which one obtains in AL i simply by currying and uncurrying. 
Symmetries of ⊔ and ↓ and [DNE]
Although the commutativity of ⊔ is clearly a classical principle, it is perhaps surprising that commutativity of B ↓ A can be proved intuitionistically.
which we can do as follows:
[From (31), (32) and CWC] (33) A corollary of the above theorem is that the double negation of the classical axiom [DNE] is provable in ŁL i .
[By (41) and Theorem 12] (42) Next we present a theorem showing that the NOR connective A ↓ B is indeed the negation of the disjunction ⊔, a fact which holds in full intuitionistic logic IL, but again, via a simple proof that appears to make essential use of the full contraction axiom. (46) and (47) and CWC] (48) 
Proof: As usual one of the directions is easy, in this case
A ↓ B ⊢ (A ⊔ B) ⊥ . We prove the other direction ((B ⊸ A) ⊸ A) ⊥ ⊢ A ⊥ ⊗ (B ⊸ A) as follows: ((B ⊸ A) ⊸ A) ⊥ [Given] (46) ((B ⊸ A) ⊸ A) ⊥ ⊸ (B ⊸ A) [Derivable] (47) B ⊸ A [From(B ⊸ A) ⊸ ((B ⊸ A) ⊸ A) ⊥ (49) ((B ⊸ A) ⊗ ((B ⊸ A) ⊸ A)) ⊥ [
Double negation homomorphism: Implication
We now show that (in ŁL i ) the double negation mapping A → A ⊥⊥ is a homomorphism for implication, i.e.
We will show the same for conjunction in Section 4.4. Note that by definition ⊥ ⊔ A ≡ A ⊥⊥ . Hence, it follows from Lemma 2 (iv) that
and hence (A ⊸ B) ⊥⊥ ⊢ A ⊸ B ⊥⊥ is provable already in AL i . We will now see that the converse implication holds in ŁL i . Again, the fact that this holds in full intuitionistic logic is well known. See [18] , page 9, for instance, for an IL-derivation of Theorem 16. That derivation, however, uses the assumption (A ⊸ B) ⊥ twice, and hence cannot be formalised in ŁL i .
Proof: By the remarks above, we have only the left-to-right direction to prove:
A ⊸ B ⊥⊥ [From (54) and (55)] (56) 
Double negation homomorphism: Conjunction
As done in Section 4.3 for implication, we now show that (in ŁL i ) the double negation mapping A → A ⊥⊥ is also a homomorphism for conjunction, i.e.
This result will follow immediately from a duality between implication (⊸) and conjunction (⊗) -Theorem 18 below. 
The implication from right to left is easy. For the other direction: 
Some De Morgan Dualities for ŁL i
Theorem 10 proves an interesting De Morgan duality between ⊓ and ⇒. For completeness, we now give analogous dualities for all of our connectives (primitive and derived).
Theorem 20 The following De Morgan dualities hold in ŁL i 
The third equation follows from Theorem 10 and [CWC]. The fourth equation can be derived as:
The fifth equation follows by:
For the sixth equation we proceed as follows:
The last equation follows from Theorem 14 and the laws for ⊓ and ⊔.
Negative Translations of Łukasiewicz Logic
In this section we show that all four translations considered (Kolmogorov, Gödel, Gentzen and Glivenko) are negative translations for ŁL i . In fact, as it is the case in IL, it turns out that any two negative translations for ŁL i are equivalent. This is a non-trivial result, since, as we have shown, the Gentzen and Glivenko translations fail for AL i . The crucial property we will need here is that the double negation mapping A → A ⊥⊥ is a homomorphism in ŁL i , as proven in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Theorem 21 The Glivenko translation (·)
Gli is a negative translation for ŁL i .
Proof:
We show by induction on the structure of A that A K ↔ A ⊥⊥ in ŁL i . This is similar to the proof of Theorem 3, where we showed that Gödel's translation is equivalent to Kolmogorov's in AL i . In here we need a slightly stronger version of Lemma 2 (vi) which in fact follows from Theorem 16. Again, the base case is trivial. For implication we have
But note that we have not yet used the full strength of our homomorphism properties for double negation, as we only used it in a "negated context". We will make use of them now to show that any translation for ŁL i which satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) will in fact also satisfy (NT3).
Lemma 22 For any formula
Proof: By induction on A ∈ N . We need to consider three cases: Theorem 23 Any translation (·) † for ŁL i which satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) is equivalent to (·) Gli and hence is a negative translation, i.e., (·) † also satisfies (NT3).
Proof: Fix a formula A. By (NT1),
can be shown as
(by (NT2) and Theorem 21)
By Theorem 21, (·) Gli satisfies (NT3), hence so does (·) † .
Corollary 24 The Gentzen translation (·)
Gen is a negative translation for ŁL i .
Proof: Since (·) Gen satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) in ŁL i .
Theorem 23 can be used to conclude that several other formula translations are also negative translations for ŁL i .
Example 1 Define a variant of the Gödel translation whereby the definition of (
i.e. the premise of the implication is not inductively translated. It is easy to see that this "simplification" still satisfies (NT1) and (NT2) and hence, by Theorem 23, is a negative translation for ŁL i . A similar simplification can be considered for the Gentzen translation, leading, again, to a negative translation for ŁL i .
Example 2 Define A † ∈ L inductively as follows:
Then we define the Krivine translation of A as A Kr = (A † ) ⊥ . The formula A Kr is clearly a negative formula. It is also easy to check that A Kr ↔ ŁL c A. Therefore, by Theorem 23, it is a negative translation for ŁL i . This translation is inspired by the negative translation behind Krivine's classical realizability interpretation [15, 17] .
Concluding Remarks
Let us conclude with an argument that supports our choice of the name "intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic" for the logic ŁL i . First, an "intuitionistic Łukasiewicz logic" should be both a fragment of Łukasiewicz logic ŁL c and intuitionistic logic IL; and ŁL i satisfies this criteria. But there are indeed other "logics" which also satisfy this criteria, so why to single out ŁL i ?
First, one might try to simply take the intersection of IL and ŁL c . This is indeed the maximal set of logical theorems which are both valid in ŁL c and IL. But it is not clear to us how one could give a simple sequent calculus for such logic. Moreover, this logic would not have the disjunction property, since [DNE] ∨ [CON] belongs to the intersection, but [DNE] is not provable in IL, and [CON] is not provable in ŁL c . Indeed, this has gone beyond what a constructivist would accept as an "intuitionistic" fragment of ŁL c .
Given our results above about the soundness of the negative translations for ŁL c and ŁL i , we want to argue that ŁL i is the only logic to be an extension of AL i having this soundness property. More precisely, let ∆ be some axiom schema such that A hoop is a pocrim in which x · (x → y) = y · (y → x) holds for every x, y and z.
In any pocrim, we define the negation operator ¬, by ¬x = x → 0, and the double negation operator, δ, by δ(x) = ¬¬x. A pocrim is involutive if δ(x) = x for every x.
The name "pocrim" is an acronym for "partially ordered, commutative, residuated, integral monoid". All the pocrims in this appendix will be finite, and hence necessarily bounded, i.e., they have a least element 0, so we will often omit "bounded".
We define the notions of satisfaction, validity, soundness and completeness in the usual way. That is to say, given a pocrim P = (P, 1, 0, ·, →; ≤) and an interpretation I : Var → P , we define the value V I (A) of a formula A under I by V I (P i ) = I(P i ),
We say I satisfies A and write I |= A if V I (A) = 1 and we say P satisfies A and write P |= A if I |= A for every interpretation of I in P. If C is a class of pocrims, we say A is valid in C and write C |= A if P |= A for every pocrim P ∈ C. We say A is sound for a class C of pocrims, if whenever A is provable in A then C |= A; we say A is complete for C if whenever C |= A then A is provable in A.
It can be shown using well-known methods that AL i is sound and complete for the class P of all bounded pocrims and that ŁL i is sound and complete for the class H of all hoops.
Note that idempotency (x = x · x for all x ∈ P ) in pocrims corresponds to contraction in logic. The smallest pocrim that is not idempotent has three elements 0, a and 1, where a is not idempotent so that we must have a · a = 0. We call this pocrim L 3 . The ordering is 1 > a > 0 and the operation tables are as follows: Here we list the elements in decreasing order so that the identity for multiplication goes in its familiar place in column 1 and row 1. We tabulate double negation as well as multiplication and implication for convenience in later calculations.
Noting that the hoop identity x · (x → y) = y · (y → x) holds in any pocrim if x ∈ {0, 1} or if x = y, one sees that L 3 is a hoop. The tabulated value of δ shows that L 3 is also involutive. It can be shown that (up to isomorphism) there are 7 pocrims of order 4 of which 2, which we call P 4 and Q 4 , are not hoops. P 4 comprises the chain 1 > b > c > 0. The operation tables for P 4 are as follows. Like P 4 , Q 4 is not a hoop since p · (p → q) = 0 = q = q · (q → p). Q 4 is involutive.
Our final example of a pocrim that is not a hoop, which we call Q 6 , has 6 elements 1 > r > s > t > u > 0. Its operation tables are as follows: Lemma 25 The following hold in the indicated pocrims:
(i) In Q 4 , δ(δ(p) · δ(q)) = 0 = 1 = δ(δ(p) · δ(q)); (ii) In P 4 , δ(δ(c) → c)) = b = 1.
Proof: Straightforward calculations using the operation tables.
If P is a pocrim, we write Th(P), for the theory of P, i.e., the set of all formulas A such that P |= A. If P is finite, then, given A, it is a finite task to decide whether P |= A. So Th(P) is recursive and hence is a recursively axiomatisable extension of AL i . In our final theorem, we give two theories that justify Theorem 6 together with explicit descriptions of their classical extensions.
Theorem 26 Let A 1 = Th(Q 6 ) and A 2 = Th(P 4 ), then
(ii) (·) Gen is a negative translation for A 2 but (·) Gli is not. 
